Photography by Irwin Wong
Kevin Carroll, Representative Director of EA International, an environmental risk management, engineering and scientific consulting company, spoke with the ACCJ Journal about the March 11 disaster, focusing on the nuclear crisis at Fukushima, and its possible impact on those of us working and living in the Tokyo area. And while the company specializes in general environmental health, toxicology (including radiation), materials, and the human responses (crisis management) to related problems, he emphasizes that he is not a nuclear physicist or engineer.
First Reactions
When asked for his first thoughts on what he saw of Fukushima on television, he replies, “I was concerned. Primarily community because there was basically no information coming out of the Tokyo government or any ministries, or TEPCO [Tokyo Electric Power Company] in particular.” For the first two days, the chaos resulting from the quake and tsunami overwhelmed the media, and he does not blame TEPCO for the lack of information, but he adds that, “By day three the picture started to emerge that Fukushima didn’t appear to be under control, and TEPCO didn’t appear to have any answers.”
From the broadcast media, it was hard to determine what was going on, but Carroll concluded from what he saw that there were issues with the reactors and the spent fuel pools. “I know enough about nuclear power engineering to tell you that the fuel sources, regardless of whether they’re in an active reactor or dormant, have to stay cool,” he says, “and as soon as we knew that power was out and TEPCO wasn’t able to bring in any trucks, my alarms started going off.” Not, he adds, that this lack of response to the failure of the backup systems was necessarily TEPCO’s fault—the infrastructure in and around the power plant was shattered (though the reactors themselves appeared to have survived the initial disaster), preventing power being supplied to the site, or even vehicles such as generator trucks from arriving.
Two additional factors contributed to Carroll’s initial concern: that offers of help from many outside experts were initially rebuffed by the Japanese government, who claimed that TEPCO could handle the crisis; and that when information did start to emerge, it was delivered in highly obscure and technical terms which could not be easily understood by the general public.
The End Result?
According to Carroll, the end result—as opposed to the general and immediate after effects—of the Fukushima crisis will be the same as that of Chernobyl, a pile of melted nuclear fuel. “No one knows what to do with it,” says Carroll. “I’m not faulting anyone. This is a nuclear power industry problem—what do you do with spent fuel?” Many seem to feel that the answer, as with Chernobyl, is to entomb the material in a concrete sarcophagus. But as Carroll points out, Chernobyl is some distance from the nearest body of water, while Fukushima is only a few hundred meters from the Pacific Ocean. “The long-term ramifications bother me,” he says.
But in the short-term, he adds, “I know enough about nuclear safety to know that the radiation itself coming out of the units where the fuel rods were exposed is an issue, but it’s an issue that’s primarily local. It’s a Fukushima problem, as opposed to a Japan problem or a Tohoku problem.”
So what has everyone worried? Carroll explains that when the hydrogen explosions at Fukushima occurred, combustible debris fell into the craters that were created, and burned. “The temperature of the fuel rods is in the hundreds of degrees and anything that falls in there is going to burn,” he explains. Smoke, composed of particulates, billowed from the structures, and those radioactive particulates were picked up by the wind and spread onto the surrounding areas, including crops, and soil. “Any surface which is out there, such as leafy vegetables, is going to be contaminated. In theory, you can wash off the radiation, but frankly, no one in their right mind is going to touch it, he says. He goes on to explain that this contamination works its way up the food chain, and now the cattle who have eaten grass in that area have been contaminated. The idea is to keep the contamination localized, and not let it move through the food chain to the human populace.
The fishing industry, which has likewise attracted a great deal of attention in the wake of the event, is also a matter of some concern to Carroll. “Sea water is not tap water,” he points out. “It contains sand, micro-organisms and particulates floating in the water, which become contaminated. Fish eat those.” And although he cites the government statement that prohibits fishing within 20 kilometers of the plant, he also warns, “Well, fish don’t stay still. They swim.” Radiation in fish works its way up the food chain in the same way as mercury–the animals at the top of the food chain accumulate most in their bodies.
However, Carroll emphasizes that, “Based on the data that’s been released to date, there doesn’t appear to be any immediate threat of airborne or water-borne exposure in Tokyo. On the question of contaminated materials, whether they be vegetables, or livestock, or fish, the government is doing everything they can to control that, and we hope that it is successful.” But, it’s better to err on the side of caution, he adds.
Even with this caution being exercised, and noting that the risk of radiation-induced illness may not be great, he admits that there are clear repercussions to our daily lives. “No matter how many people tell you that that head of Ibaraki lettuce is safe, if you have a choice between that Ibaraki lettuce and a head of Brazilian lettuce without a hint of contamination, even if it’s twice the price, which one are you going to buy and feed to your kids? It’s not the risk, it’s the perception of risk,” he says. “And that’s already having real consequences. We’ve received numerous calls from clients who manufacture products in Japan, some of them nowhere near the affected prefectures, but as a condition of export, their customers are insisting that we test these products for radioactivity before shipping. It’s not a big deal. You can do it, but it’s an additional cost in the manufacturing chain.” He describes the entire situation as a “horrible reputational risk [for Japan]… and some of it is not even warranted.”
So Wasn’t He Worried?
Carroll admits that he was somewhat concerned at the time when the plants weren’t being cooled, during which the fires appeared to be uncontrollable. And for medical reasons, he took his daughter to Osaka for a few days (she requires medication that must be refrigerated, and there was no guarantee that power would be consistent). Despite the recent stabilization of matters, he remains somewhat concerned: “There still continues to be a risk of fire. If [TEPCO] loses cooling capacity through another quake or tsunami or other disaster, and the fuel rods are exposed, they will auto-ignite and it will spread. How far? No one knows. So far, Tokyo’s been lucky, with the prevailing winds blowing south to north.”
However, even this scenario is not as dire as it first appears. The advice given by the British Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) as relayed by the co-chair and British Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir John Beddington, is that in the highly remote event of a worst possible scenario (all four reactors and fuel pools simultaneously catching fire, with a strong wind continuing to blow towards Tokyo for at least two days), staying indoors and avoiding exposure to contaminants would circumvent the worst radiation-related risks. Carroll concurs, adding that, “If you can do it, that would probably make the most sense.”
The risk of radiation-induced cancer exists, as he admits, but this is essentially a statistical matter, which has many variables related to individual physiology. Carroll says that even after such a catastrophic event such as the one described above, “My conclusions at the moment are that you [would not be] likely to die of radiation exposure. You [would] likely have a host of other problems immediately after that event, including food and water and infrastructure breakdown.”
During such an event, water might be contaminated and considered unsafe to drink. And while activated charcoal filters may absorb some radiation, Carroll emphasizes that, “Anything will absorb something of anything. This [activated charcoal] is not the solution.” Food already in the stores might be safe, but food in transit would be suspect. It might even be unsafe to leave shelter for extended periods. And there are other problems that might also arise. In such situations, “The dominoes start to fall in rapid succession,” he points out.
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